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W H Y  A R E  REFORM S NO N -SU STAIN ED ?: A CASE ST U D Y  OF
T U R K E Y
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M A ST E R  OF ECO N O M ICS  
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Izak Atiyas 
September, 1996
The factors affecting the reform sustenance are the main topic of this thesis. We 
focus on the tax financing package that we assume necessary for a large-scale reform 
progi'cim. We show theoretically how direct cincl indirect taxes may lead to the 
actual reform duration cind costs be under estimated by the labour class. Factors 
such as tax-shifting and access to financial adaptation were deterministic in our 
claims. Using Turkish time series data for public wages and salaries, we try to show 
tax-shifting empirically by estimating a real wage determination equation. Partial 
evidence for tax-shifting in real public salaries was found. A simple recapitulative 
model establishing the link with the results derived by the related literature wcis 
postulated.
Keywords: Reform, Sustenance, Tax-Shifting, Financial Adaptation, Wage
Determination Equcition.
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T Ü R K İY E ’DE R E FO R M LA R  NİÇİN DEVAM LI DEĞİL ?
Salah Jelassi
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, iktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. İzak Atiyas 
Eylül, 1996
Reformların devamlılığını etkileyen faktörler bu tezin temel konusunu oluşturmaktadır. 
Geniş kapsamlı bir reform programı için gerekli olduğnu varsaydığmız vergi 
finansman paketi üzerinde yoğunlaşmaktayız. Direk ve dolaylı vergilerinin gerçek 
reform süre ve maliyetlerinin işçi sınıfı tarafından daha az tahmin edilmesine sebep 
olduğnu teorik olarak göstermekteyiz. Vergi zıplamaları ve finansal adaptasyonlar 
çalışmamızda deterministle olarak ele alınmıştır. Vergi zıplamasını ampirik olarak 
gösterebilmek için reel ücreti belirleyen denklem tahminini Türk kamu sektörü 
ücret datasını kullanarak gerçekleştirdik. Reel kamu ücretlerinde vergi zıplaması 
olduğna dair bazı sonuçlara ulaştık. Basit özet bir model ilgili literatürle bağicintıları 
göstermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rerform, Devamlılık, Vergi Zıplaması, Finansal Adaptasyon­
lar, Ücret Belirleme Denklemi.
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Introduction: Literature Review
'I'he main aim of political-economics is to view economic phenomena that seem 
to be irrational, as a rational outcome of the actions of self-interested individuals 
nuiximizing their utility.
In Tui'key, an interesting feature produced by the 1994 and 1996 elections, is the 
increasing votes going to the Islamic fundamentalist party which is viewed to be 
against the reform process that was started in the eaidy 1980’s.
This question falls in the area of the so called new political economy, which 
tries to view apparently irrational outcomes as an interaction between political and 
institutional factors and macroeconomic policy aspects using the tools of mainstream 
economic analysis and game theory.
As a rejection of the classical idea of a benevolent social planner and exogenous 
policy determination, researchers in this area have developed theoretical models 
where economic policy is determined endogenously as an interaction among different 
agents each challenged by his self-interest.
A politically sustainable reform package can be defined as one for which there is 
sufficient political support to carry out the reforms to their completion. This political 
support can take various forms; for example the re-election of the government that 
started the reforms, a sufficient degree of parliamentary support for reforms, and 
a large degree of socicd acceptability. In contrast, frequent labor union organized 
strikes, an increasing degree of political polarization and ci slow-acting parliament
are considered as signals of reform failure. The related literature has been tackling 
this iDi’oblem from both a normative and a positive perspective. The normative 
perspective is particularly present in the analysis of how institutions affect policy 
Ibrmcition. This perspective is very relevant due to the critical role of institutions 
in determining the reform-environment. The status of the central bank, the social 
choice process, the state of the bureaucracy and the strength of political parties 
and their discipline are just examples of such critical institutions. The positive 
perspective is cilso important from a policy point of view because it can give insights 
on the type of policies that cire more likely to emerge from specific political cind 
institutional settings, and therefore assist in the design of politically sustainable 
policies.
In what remains in this introductive chapter we will provide a literature survey of 
what kind of structural features and economic policy choices and how they interact 
to affect the reform process.
1.1 structural Features:
As pointed earlier the feasibility and political sustainability of an economic reform 
is affected to a large extent by the underlying structural features. In this context, 
we examine how the pre-reform economic environment, the institutional structure 
and the nature of the politiccil system come out to be deterministic factors in the 
reform success.
1.1.1 Pre-reform Economic Environment:
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A wide number of pre-reform environment conditions have an impact on macroe­
conomic policy reform. Rodrik (1993) argues that macroeconomic imbalances 
determine the urgency of a reform. In circumstances of extreme macroeconomic 
imbalances, a reform can benefit from the unsustainability of the status c[uo to gain 
the necessary support for its adoption. Laban and Sturzenegger (1994) carry this 
point further and show theoretically that even if there is no uncertainty about the 
evolution path of the economy of getting worse, it may be optimal to posti)one the
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reform, this stems from the fact that stabilization is costly and involves risk. The 
cuialogy is made with a patient who needs to undergo a risky operation. The high 
risk of not surviving may make it optimal to postpone the operation and live another 
year with certainty although the patient knows that he must eventually be operated 
on and his condition is deteriorating.
Moreover, a country with a higher per capita income is more prepcired to 
withstand the adjustment costs that are associated with the reform. However, this 
better initial .situation may form an obstacle for the reform to pass due to the fact 
that tluj majority may stick to the status quo faced with the reform costs and its 
uncertain benefits. This leads to the fact that reforms in countries with a more 
unequal income distribution need to address the impact of these measures on lower- 
income groups that are less likely to stick to their initial situation.
On the other hand, a skewed income distribution can also form an obstacle to an 
economic I'eforrn as it is often associcited with a sharper degree of polarization of 
the society that makes it more difficult to reach consensus on certain policy issues.
Microeconomic distortions affect the burden-sharing of the reform costs across 
population groups together with the amount of resource reallocation associated with 
the removal of the distortions.
Credibility is another factor that can be deterministic in a stabilization program’s 
failure. In a country with a history of failed reform attempts, the behavior of the 
public will be inconsistent with the attainment of reform goals, thus effectively 
dooming the reform plan to failure (Calvo (1988)).
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that in the presence of identity-uncertainty, 
that is when individual gainers and losers can not be identified ex-ante, there will 
be a bias towards the status quo. This may take place even if there is no aggregate- 
uncertainty regcirding the consequences of the reform. They show that a reform 
may fail to be adopted although it may benefit expost. Conversly, a reform may be 
adopted originally but fails to gain the necessary support to sustain it. The writers 
apply their cinalysis to tiuide liberalization as an interesting example of the delay of 
a. widely cigreed-upon beneficial reform. By assuming that in order lor a worker to 
sliift from one sector to another, he should incur a two component cost: A general 
investment cost incurred prior to switching sectors and cui individual specific cost
element incurred only upon actually switching sectors and is revealed only when 
the general investment cost is incurred; the previously claimed results of beneficial- 
reform delay is derived.
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1.1.2 Institutional Structure:
The second structurcil feature that heavily influences the economic reform process 
is the underlying institutional structure. The examples of such an interaction are 
numerous.
Liberalization of foreign direct investment is unlikely to be effective in the absence 
of a well defined system of property rights or in the absence of a functional banking 
system. Fiscal consolidation may be more difficult to attain in an institutional 
setting with decentralized expenditure centers. The speed of labor reallocation 
across sectors following structural reforms depends, among other things, on the 
flexibility of labor market institutions.
Another important and quite stressed institutional factor is the status of the 
central bank. The autonomy of the centred in choosing the instruments of monetary 
policy is described by: (i) the influence of the government in determining how much 
to borrow from the central bank, and (ii) the nature of the monetary instruments 
under the control of the central bank. If the government can influence the quantity 
and the conditions on which it borrows from the central bank, it also influences 
the creation of monetary base and lessens the economic independence of the central 
bank. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tcibellini (1991) claim that one of the alleged benefits 
of an independent central bank is that it is more credible in its resolve not to 
engage in public financing. This may affect the treasury’s behavior, reducing the 
likelihood of unsustainable debt policies. They show empirically that central bank 
independence is on average associated with lower inflation, irrespective of political 
institutions and budgetary problems.
On the other hand, constraints on fiscal policy imposed by the legislature, such 
as balanced budget requirements, although may reduce policy flexibility, if adhered 
to, will enhance fiscal discipline. Bayounii and Eichengreen (1995) provide evidence 
indicating that U.S states with stringent statutory and constitutional restrictions
on deficit spending and debt issue have more stable fiscal balances.
Finally, we should note that the institutional structure is a complex factor 
affecting reform sustainability stemming from the fact that it is not invariant. Rather 
it tends to change during the reform process with a velocity that depends on country- 
specific characteristics.
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1.1.3 Nature of the Political System:
The third structural feature that is related to the reform process is the nature of 
the political system. It simply determines the environment in which the reform will 
survive.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) stress in their analysis the fact that governments 
are not monolithic entities of standard economic models that have full control of 
the policy instruments and that manage them according to a stable and a well- 
defined objective function. When power is dispersed, either across branches of the 
government (as in the U.S), or across many political parties in a coalition government 
(as is typical in Turkey), or across parties through the alteration of political control 
over time, the likelihood of inter temporally inefficient policy is heightened. The 
budget problem for a coalition government arises from three factors. First, the 
individual coalition partners in multi-party governments have distinctive interests 
and distinctive constituencies. There is no single uniform objective function for the 
Vcirious political parties in the government. There is likely to be a fundamental 
prisoner’s dilemma with respect to budget cuts: all the partners of the cocilition 
may prefer comprehensive budget cuts to a continuation of large deficits, but 
each cocilition partner may have the incentive to protect its particular part of the 
budget against the austerity measures in the absence of strong coordination between 
members of the coalition to produce the ’’ cooperative” outcome, the noncooperative 
solution of no-budget cutting is quite likely to arise. Second, individual coalition 
partners will often have enormous power to prevent a change in the status quo, 
though they will not typically have the power by themselves to implement a positive 
program of change. In other words, coalition members will have a veto against 
change. Even a very small party in a multi-party coalition can have enormous 
power by virtue of its ability to brecik up the government. Moreover, a coalition will
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typically divide responsibilities over various parts of the budget among the various 
members (this is certainly true in part by virtue of the distribution of ministerial 
positions among the parties). Third, the enforcement mechanisms among coalition 
partners to assure the cooperative outcome will often be very weak.
The importance of the time-horizon of the government for budget policy was 
stressed by Alesina and Tabellini (1987). They emphasize thcit when political power 
alternates randomly between competing political parties, each government will be 
tempted to leave a legacy of high debt for its successor whose spending priorities it 
is not likely to share. The high debt restrains the spending by the next government, 
but the current government cares little about the next government’s spending in 
any case. Presumebly, the more rapid the turnover of the government, the more 
important would be this deficit bias effect.
Alesina and Perotti (1993) using assembled data for seventy countries show that 
politiccil polarization that often results from unequal income distribution increases 
socio-political instability. Income inequality increases social discontent and fuels 
social unrest. The latter, by increasing the probabilities of coups, revolutions, mass 
violence or more generally by increasing policy uncertainty and threatening property 
rights, has a negative effect on investment and as a consequence reduces growth. The 
link between income inequality and growth is viewed through another channel by 
Alesina and Rodrik (1991,1993). They claim that in more unequal societies, the 
demand for fiscal distribution financed by distortionary taxation is higher, causing 
a lower rate of growth.
In the case where voters are perceived to be ’’myopic” , the phenomenon of what 
we call ’’ election-politics” may arise. Incumbants would think twice before cidopting 
reform measures that may cause short-term costs for fear that this would lead 
to electoral defeat. Alesina and Roubini (1992) provide some, evidence that the 
policy stance of governments change significantly in electoral years. Milesi-Ferretti 
(1992) constructs a simple model in which it may be rational for a government 
facing an election not to embark on a disinflationary program, even though voters’ 
behavior is forward looking. This may be due to three reasons. First, designing 
an efFicient disinflationary program is costly: by devoting resources to this purpose, 
the government forgoes ’’ popularity” or the possibility to maintain current levels of
government consumption. Second, disinflation entails unavoidable output costs, but 
these costs are uncertain. Third, the government cares about being in power, for 
reasons that go beyond the possibility to implement its most preferred policies.
1.2 Economic Policy Choices:
Another body of the related literature has been emphasizing how the economic 
policy choices affect the reform success.
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1.2.1 Speed, Depth and Sequencing of reform:
In our previous discussion our arguments were valid for any type of a reform. 
Howerver, here we differentiate between macroeconomic stabilization such as 
reduction of inflation or of fiscal imbalances; and economic reform such as trade 
liberalization, the removal of price controls, privatization and restructuring. The 
difference is that stabilization policies are typically short-term while some economic 
reforms take a longer time to be implemented.
Gradualism versus ” big-bang” type of a reform is a genuine question to cirise in 
the case of a structural large-scale transformation. On the other hand, in the case 
where reform packages include several measures, the appropriate sequence in which 
those measures are to be adopted is another matter that is open for debate.
Dewatripont and Roland (1992) using a simplified model of restructuring where 
a reform-minded government faces a set of sectors with a work force which is 
heterogeneous in terms of relative opportunities outside their current jobs, shows 
that gradualism can be better than full immediate reform when the financial cost 
of compensations necessary to respect the existing political constraints are very 
high compared to the allocative gain of immediate restructuring. Gradualism is less 
costly for the budget because it allows for better rent extraction from some groups 
of workers.
In contrast, Mcirtinelli and Tommasi (1994) claim that by widening the scope of 
efficiency improving reforms, the government is more likely to gain the support ol 
larger segments of the population, particularly il the losers ol each particular measure
cire benefited by other measures. If the government needs to pass a threshold of 
popular support at each step, a gradual process risks being stopped at each stage by 
the group being hurt at that point. Note that this provides an explanation for why 
Latin American countries that failed when implementing gradualist programs in the 
ecirly 1980s, have been relatively successful in later undertciking more comprehensive 
attempts at reform.
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1.2.2 Distributional Aspects and Foreign Assistance:
Distributional aspects play a role in economic reform since the economic impact of 
these usually Vciries across population groups. Measures that soften the impact of 
the reform costs on the low income groups such as social safety nets, may enhance 
the political sustainability of reforms.
Mussa (1984) argues that it is not always the case that those more directly affected 
by reforms are the lowest-income groups. In such cases, redistributive measures 
intended to protect the reform may involve compensation to special interest groups 
that benefit from the pre-reform policies. Moreover, some stabilization measures, 
such as inflation reduction, may have positive distributional effects. Various studies 
suggest that inflation is a regressive tax whose burden falls disproportionately on 
lower income groups with limited access to hedging instruments (Cardoso(1992)).
Redistributive schemes that may seem to be necessary for the survival of a reform 
may represent a problem of implementation. From one side, a weak institutional 
structure and a lack of technical competence of the civil service may complicate 
such a process. On the other hand, for poor countries with limited access to capital 
markets, and countries facing adverse external conditions such as a war or a drastic 
reduction of transfers from abroad, budgetary problems may constrciin the feasibility 
of such schemes. Such budgetary problems may be lessened by foreign assistance. 
In general, foreign credit and assistance allows a country to smooth consumption 
over time when faced with short-run costs ol stabilization and reform. This widens 
the policy options of a reforming government, and may enable a country to start 
reforms earlier or choose a quicker pace of reform.
1.3 The Interplay between Structural Features 
and Economic Policy Choices:
The structural institutional and political features and economic policy choices 
interact with each other to determine the reform ’’ destiny” . The examples of such an 
intei'ciction ci.re numerous some of which will be discussed in a comparatively larger 
detail in this section.
1.3.1 Initial Macoeconomic Disequilibrium:
When initial macroeconomic disequilibria are extreme, the ’’ status quo” is clearly 
unsustainable. In such situations, it may be easier to gather political support to 
reform measures. Rodrik (1993) argues that the benefits from stabilization Ccin 
make it politically easier to simultaneously implement reforms that involve a greater 
amount of redistribution among population groups. This can result because the 
’’ losers” from reforms are compensated with the gains from the stabilization.This 
suggests that the failure to combine reforms involving redistribution with measures 
that beneht the entire population may account for the difficulties in gaining enough 
sustenance for the reform.
Krueger (1993) argues that the suspension of politics in a period of crisis Ccin 
facilitate the implementation of reform measures. This is due to the fact that such 
measures can become self-sustaining over time, as new constituences supporting the 
reform emerge throughout the process.
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1.3.2 Sequencing and Speed of Reforms:
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that there are some cases where the reform is 
not implemented ex-ante although it may be optimal. Wei (1993), in the context 
of a trade liberalization, shows that adopting the reform grcidually may help over 
passing such difficulties. This stems from the fact that a gradual process of a reform 
may alter the nature of political system by building a constituency in favor of the 
continuation of reforms.
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Martinelli and Tommasi (1993) Show that time inconsistency problems may 
require the ’’ optimal” sequencing of reforms to be altered in order to guarantee 
its politiccil feasibility and sustainability. They assume that different reforms entail 
different winners and losers. Hence simultaneous implementation of all reforms 
although sometimes suboptimal, is politically sustainable.Once a reform has been 
adopted, its beneficiaries have no incentive to support further reforms that may hurt 
them and benefit other groups. The critical implicit assumption made by Martinelli 
and Tommasi is that no reversal of previous refoi'ms occurs if subsecpient ones fail to 
be adopted, so that ’’ early” winners have an incentive to withhold further support.
Conversely, Dewatripont and Roland (1993) assume reforms are rather comple­
mentary, in the sense that the interruption of the reform process implies a costly 
reversal of previously implemented ones. The reversal costs rises as the reform 
progresses. Consequently, a big-bang strategy is very costly to reverse which 
may yield its sustainability. By contrast, a gradualist strcitegy retains the option 
of reversed should reforms prove unsuccessful, and is therefore harder to sustain 
politically.
1.3.3 Speed of Reform in the Case of Restructuring:
Economic restructuring is a kind of an economic reform that involves sectors in which 
resources are used inefficiently, and in which realization of efficiency requires labor 
shedding and a more intensive use of resources. If the political situation is such that 
’’ restructuring” requires the support of a majority of workers in the sector, these 
may need to be compensated to relinquish their jobs. Dewatripont and Roland(1992) 
argue that the task of the government to design workable compensation schemes is 
complicated by the fact of informational asymmetry in the sense that the government 
does not know how the workers differ in their employment opportunities outside the 
sector. This is a reflection of a more general problem of previously centrally-planned 
economies of the existence of ’’hidden rents” from the current status quo that ¿rcross 
social groups such cis housing privileges, legal and illegal parallel activities..etc.
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1.3.4 Credibility and Political Uncertainty:
Another point mentioned earlier is how the lack of credibility and political 
uncertainty can lead to the failure of reforms. Failure of the government to fulfill 
its commitments in its previous reform attempts enhance such credibility problem 
and increase the degree of political uncertainty.
Rodrik (1989) suggests that the sustainability of the reform may benefit from 
an initial ’’ overshooting” , because this will enhance credibility by signaling to the 
public the seriousness of the government’s intentions. This would push the public 
to chase actions that take the government’s commitment to reform as established, 
thus facilitating reform.
Lack of credibility is likely to arise when the political system is fragmented or 
polarized. When the political system is fragmented, agents can come to doubt the 
government’s ability to ensure sufficient support for reform measures over the time, 
because several groups may have veto power. In this case, in which the political 
situation following the implementation of reforms is likely to become fragmented 
or unstable, with a status quo bias, an early and simultaneous implementation 
of reforms may be the strategy that ensures the political sustainability. If the 
economic reform reversal is not costless, the high costs associated with such tin 
act may preclude a rollback even in a difficult political situation. A more gradual 
approach may instead run into political difficulties, as the fragmented or polarized 
political system makes it harder to implement further reform metisures.
1.3.5 The Supply Response to Reforms:
The supply response to economic reforms is extremely important in determining 
their politiccil sustainability. When reforms fail to reach their expected results, 
or when the costs associated with the transition period cire higher than expected, 
reform reversal is more likely for several reasons. First, voters may inter from events 
that the implemented reforms are ineffective, in which case they will be against 
them. Second, voters may believe that the government has been ineffective in policy 
implementation, and therefore vote for opposition groups who are seen as being less 
favoralile to reform.
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A paper by Wijnbergen (1992) stresses the importance of a quick output supply 
response for the sustainability of reform. The author’s main argument is that 
opposition to price liberalization may be fueled by the fear of a low output supply 
response to freed prices. In such framework, a gradual removal of price controls 
can leiid to hoarding with the purpose of intertemporal speculation, as prices 
cire e.xpected to rise in the future. The fact that production is withheld from 
the market while inventories are being accumulated can generate shortages and 
therefore a perception of low output supply response. This perception can lead to 
the opposition to the removed of remaining controls, as individuals come to expect 
that higher prices will not be sufficiently compensated by an increased availability 
of goods. Conversely, an immediate full price liberalization can eliminate incentives 
for hoarding and intertemporal speculation, thus enhancing the response of sales to 
price decontrols. This enhanced response can strengthen the political support for 
price reform. Therefore, in this case immediate price liberalization is not only more 
efficient, but also more credible since political considerations are less likely to lead 
to future reversals.
1.3.6 Distributional Conflict:
The changes associated with the beginning of a process of economic reform will 
inevitably give rise to distributional conflicts. Alesina and Drazen (1991) use a 
model of ’’ war of attrition” to study this issue. The writers give three reasons that 
suggest modeling delayed stabilization as a war of attrition:
1. In the political debate over stabilization, the distributional question of how 
the burden of higher taxes or expenditure cuts should be allocated is central.
2. When stabilization occurs, it coincides with a political consolidation. Often 
one side becomes politically dominant. The burden of stabilization is 
sometimes quite unequal with the politically weaker groups baring a larger 
burden.
3. Successful stabilizations are usually preceded by several failed attempts. Often 
the previous program appears to be similar to the successful one.
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For a war of attrition between heterogeneous individuals to give expected finite 
delay in concession under incomplete information, two features are important:
1. There must be a cost to remaining in the fight, that is not conceding.
2. The pciyoff to the winner must exceed that to the loser.
In their model, Alesina and Drazen assume that before stabilization the 
government is incurring a budget deficit with increasing debt which is financed 
through distortionary methods, mainly inflation taxes. A fraction 7 of the debt is 
fincinced through distortionary taxation. Now there are two interest groups in the 
economy and stabilization is achieved through the elevation of taxes sufficient to 
prevent further growth in the debt. An agreement to stabilize is an agreement on 
how these taxes are to be apportioned between the two groups. The ’’ loser” assumes 
a fraction a > 0.5 of the tax, and the winner a fraction (1 — a). A value of a close to 
1 represents a high degree of polarization or a lack of political cohesiveness. Taxes 
after stabilization are assumed to be non distortionary. Before stabilization each 
group knows his loss from distortionary taxation ¿^, as well as the distribution of 
his opponent’s losses F{0j).
A certain group will not concede as long as his expected utility from being subject 
to the distortion or that his opponent concedes thus paying only the fraction (1 — a) 
of the tax, exceeds his utility from paying a fraction a and avoiding the distortionary 
losses Bi. The following main results are shown:
1. The higher is 7 the earlier is stabilization.
2. An increase in 9 will bring the stabilization earlier.
3. If a =  0.5 stabilization occurs immediately, and the closer a to 1 the later is 
the expected date of stabilization.
1.4 Conclusion:
Throughout this introductory chapter, we have seen that ensuring political support 
and sustenance of an economic reform is quite a complex matter that requires
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a careful consideration of the political and institutional environment in which 
the reform is implemented, and of the distributive consequences they generate. 
Studies in this topic, clearly could not provide firm conclusions and a set of policy 
recommendations guaranteed to ensure the sustainability and success of reforms. 
However, the literature does provide useful insights and generalizations in the 
complex interciction between economic and political factors, whose Vcilidity and 
applicability requires a careful study of actual policy experiences in the reforming 
country cuid in others.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Foundations
2.1 Direct Taxes: Who actually pays for them ?
Following any reform package that aims at trade liberalization, by removing price 
controls, implementing privatization and resti'ucturing, there should be ci financing 
tax package.
Our claim here is simple: Originiilly, an individual will take the decision to 
support a reform depending on the announced tax shares and his expected benefits 
from the reform. The point here, is that an individual may underestimate or, 
reciprocally, overestimate his costs due to the fact that the true incidence of the tax 
is not a matter that can be determined easily. Rather, the person who effectively 
pciys a tax is not necessarily the person upon who the tax is levied.
2.1.1 The Model:
In order to clarify our chiirn, we use Solow’s (1956) one-sector equilibrium growth 
model. We assume that the production side is governed by a constant return to 
scale technology:
‘ I would like to thank Dr. Osman Zaim for his potential contributions in this section.
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Y = F{K,L)  (2.1)
where: Y=  aggregate output level,
F =  total capital,
L-- total labor force,
and F  is a twice differentiable increasing concave function, homogeneous of degree
one
Now, using the homogeneity assumption on F, equation (4.1) can be rewritten
clS
r  =  i  . f{k) (2.2)
where: k — ^  =the capital labor ratio.
and f "  < 0 follow from the assumption described above.
Labor is assumed to be inelastically supplied as a fixed proportion of a population 
growing exponentially at a rate n over time v,:
L = Lo-U (2.3)
or
6u
=  Lone"“ -  nL
that is
where: L =  a^u
L
L = ^
(2.4)
Capital is also assumed to be inelastically supplied, and its growth to depend 
on savings and depreciation. The gross saving out of output is assumed to depend 
on the capital-labor ratio. Description is assumed to have the simple form of a 
proportionate rate of capital. That is :
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K = s { k ) Y - '^ -K  (2.5)
where 7 stands for the rate of depreciation.
Now, substituting (2.2) into (2.5) and rearranging yields the equation in (2.6):
k  = s{k)L.f{k)--^.K 
k  ^ s{k)L.f{k)
K K
k  _  s{k)f{k)
K k
■ 7
- 7 (2 .6)
Now, we suppose that our economy is in the equilibrium pcith, so that both labor 
and capital cire fully employed. Thus differentiating (2.1) and rearranging yields the 
equation in (2.7);
8_2 _  6F^6J^ ^ 6 ^
8u ~ 8 L ' 8 u ^ k k ' l k
r  ^  ( F l -L\L·  i F K - K \ k  
Y \ Y ) L'^ \ Y ) K
(2.7)
where: =  f ,
k  -  f - ,d lL ’
and Fi =  for i = K, L.
By letting a =  , and (1 — cv) = , where a and {1 — a) stand for the
factor-output shares of labor cind capital respectively. Thus substituting (2.4) into 
(2.7), we get:
gr = oc-n + { l -  a)gi. ( 2 .8 )
where the letter g stands for growth. That is the output growth will be the 
weighted average of both the growth in capital and labor.
On the other hand, assuming perfect competition would have the implication 
that payments to the factors are equal to the value of their marginal products. 
Equivalently, using (2.2) we can write the eqiuition in (2.9) and (2.10):
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w = 6Y s ( f )
- m
w =
K
J j
f{k)  -  k · . f {k )
= m . f { k)
(2.9)
6Y S ( f ) ,
r =  L . ^ ^ . f ' ( k )
SK 6K
(2,10)
Using equation (2.4) and (2.6), the growth in the capital-labor ratio Ccin be 
e.xpressed as in equation (2.11):
9k
u ih. ^
___  ____ 6 lL  ___  Su
k k 
\^ k l - L k
I±
L
L2
I±
L
gi< -  9 L 
s{k)S(k) 
k — 7 — n
s{k)f{k) -  {n + -f)k 
k (2.11)
Now, assuming that before the tax reform, our economy was in a stable state 
governed by a balanced growth characterized by gy =  = gi — n and <7r· =  0 .
Using equation (2.11), this would imply that;
s{k)j(k)  — (n -|- 'y)k — 0 (2.12)
That is gross savings per worker are just the necessary amount to offset 
depreciation and the capital-deepening necessary to allow for the growth of the 
labor force.
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2.1.2 Extension of the Model by Imposing a Capital-tax
(¿c )·
Until this stage, we have assumed that there are no taxes. The imposition of a 
tax on capital would effect the capital-labor ratio (k) and the saving function. 
The rationelle behind the first cirgument is that a capital tax disturbs the relative 
cost structure of the factors of the production, leading to a factor substitution that 
changes the previously prevailing capital-labor ratio (k). The fact that the savings 
function will be affected by the Ccipital tax can be rationalized by using a Kaldoricin 
approach where there is a propensity to save out of profits and s«, out of wages. 
This results in gross savings to have the following form:
s{k) ■ f{k) =  Sr(l -  a) · f{k)  -f · a · f{k) (2.1.3)
A capital tax tc will affect the factor output shares, thus affecting savings. 
Therefore , the steady-state configuration in (12) can be rewritten after the 
introduction of a capital tax tc as:
’[k{tc), tc] ■ f[k{tc)] -  (n -b  7 ) · k{tc) =  0 (2.14)
Now, let us study the effect of an increase in the capital-tax tc, on the steacl3^ -state 
pcittern of growth. This is done by partially differentiating (14) with respect to U:
ds dk ds d f  dk dk
- • - V  +  s r - / + ‘ " 5 i ' 5 r - ( ’‘ - 7 ) 5 T  =  odk dtc
or
dtc dtc
(2.15)
where: =  |f
and
ft _
“  c)A; ’
-  at.
dk
[Sk- f  + S- f  -  (”  +  7 ) ] ^  =  ■ / (2.16)
If we assume that an increase in tc will decrease the propensity to siwe (i.e. < 0
), then the sign of will depend on the sign of A -  Sk · f  + s ■ f  -  {n +  7 ). Note
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that A is just the response of the steady state to a change in capital-labor ratio 
(differentiating (12) with respect to A: ). The stability of the stable-state would 
require gross savings in the case of a decrease in k, to be at a level higher than 
the one needed for depreciation and compensating for the labor growth, in order to 
allow for capital accumulation and re-establishment of the steady-state capital-labor 
ratio. This would imply that A is negative. Hence, an increase in the tax on capital 
would lead to a decrease in the capital-labor ratio.
Now, we .see how will this decrease in k initiated by an increase in tc , affect the 
wcige-capital return ratio, ( f ) .  Using (9) and (10), (^^jcan be expressed as:
(2.17)^  _  m  -  k · f i k )
r f'{k)
Differentiating (2.17) with respect to k and rearranging yields the equation i 
(2.18):
n
^  [/-(t )  -  f'(k) -  kr(k)\ f'{h) -  [f(k) -  kf (k)]  r [ k )
dk [{ ' {k)f
where the positive sign of (17) is implied by the concavity of /  . Thus an increase 
in ic will decrease k , and hence decrease .
Now, for the sake of completeness, we study separately the effect of the change 
in the capital-labor ratio {k) on wages (¿y), the gross rate of return to capital (?’ ) 
cind the net after-tcix rate of return to capital (r* =  (1 =  i )^ r).
Using equation (2.9), the response of wages can be written as:
div
dk
=  r {k )  -  [ k f ik )  +  f {k) ]  
= - k f " { k ) > 0 (2.19)
where the positive sign in (19) follows from the concavity of J.
Using the e.xpression in (10), the effect ol a change in the capital-labor ratio can 
be expressed as:
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dv
â j = m < o (2.20)
Finally, the effect of a change in the capital-labor ration on the net after-tax rate 
ol return to capital can be expressed straightforward from the special form of the 
savings function (1.3) assuming that sf io) =  0 (a quite fair cissumption):
=  ,s,..(l -  a)f{k)
=  S r . r * . k
Using (2.12), r*can be expressed as;
(2.21)
i.e., r
* (^ +  7 )r =  ---------- =  cte
is not affected by a change in the capital-labor ratio (k).
(2 .22)
2.1.3 Results:
Throughout the last subsection, the following results were derived:
1. ^  < 0 i.e. an increase in the tax on capital will induce a decline in the 
capital-labor ratio.
d( — )
2. >  0 i.e. a decline in the capital-labor ratio will generate a decline in the 
wage-capital return ratio
3. I f  > 0 i.e. a decline in the capital-labor ratio causes a decline in wage earnings.
4. I f  < 0 i.e. a decline in the capital-labor ratio will lead to an increase in the 
gross return to capital.
5. ^  =  0 i.e. a change in the Ccipitcil-hibor ratio does not affect the net return 
to Ccipital (if we assume that the marginal propensity to save out of wages: 
S-w =  0).
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In other words, and to establish the link with our topic, the imposition or an 
increase in the Ccipital tax as a part of the tax package that usually accompanies 
an economic reform will be totally shifted to the labor class. As a result, in our 
framework, we can conclude that although the tax was imposed initially on capital, 
it was shifted, and the actiuil payers come out to be the wage-earners.
Thus, if we assume that this mechanism of tax shifting is not discovered by the 
labor class, they may vote for a certain tax reform ex-ante, but expost and after 
realizing that their costs are actually more than what they expected, may be willing 
to ’’ short-cut ’’ the reform and return to the status-quo.
2.2 Indirect Taxes (Seignorage): Who Actually 
pays for Them?
Now we turn our attention to another source of public financing, namely seignorage. 
In Turkey a large share of public deficit is financed through the centrcil bank. The 
ability of the central bank to do so stems from two sources. First, the central bank 
captures a fiirge inflow of foreign exchange resources due to the fact that it borrows 
from abroad, hold the foreign exchange deposits of Turks working abroad, and 
imposes the revenue requirements on foreign exchange deposits held in commercial 
ba,nks. Second, the central bank also finances the public sector directly through 
money creation.
Total seignorage as a percentage of GNP is measured by J ’
stcinds for the base money at time ¿, including currency, required reserves, and 
excess reserves. In Turkey, total seignorage was high in 1979 ¿incl amounting to 
4.6 percent of GNP. Such revenue then oscillated between 3.2 and 4.2 percent of 
GNP between 1980 and 1984 and declined steadily afterward to an estimated 1.7 
percent of GNP in the first semester of 1987.This decline in the seignorage revenue 
can be exphiined by two factors; the revenue requirement which includes the reserve 
requirement ratios, computation method, ¿md the banks complicince with the rules; 
and the portfolio behavior of asset holders, which is influenced by inflation, interest 
rates, output growth, and the emergence of close substitutes for domestic money.
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This latter point will be the main focus of this section.
Before proceeding further, let us stop for a moment and try to analyze the reasons 
behind this decline in total seignorage revenue. Total seignorage ] can be
broken into two components:The inflation tax and the real growth of base
money , where pt is the consumer price index (CPI) annual inflation
rate. The inflation tax stems from the fact that asset holders try to preserve the 
real value of their money balances.The amount demanded to reach this end depends 
positively on the inflation rate and is supplied by the central bank at negligible 
cost. It can then be transferred to the public sector to hnance the purchase of goods 
cind services. The second component measures the variation in the real stock of 
money. These variations can be caused by variations in real output, inflation or 
interest rates, as well as financial innovations or changes in the reserve requirement 
regime. Real output, inflation, and interest rates affect demand for base money by 
affecting demand for financial assets. The reserve requirement ratio directly affects 
the demand for base money through changing the required reserves for a given real 
stock of deposits. Finally, innovations in the financial system may affect demand foi- 
base money either directly (for example, the development of an interbank market 
reduces the bank’s excess reserve for the same real stock of deposits) or indirectl}'  ^(for 
example, better cash management may reduce the firm’s demand for sight deposits).
In Turkey the dominant component in seignorage revenue originates in the 
inflation tax due to the inflation rates that prevailed throughout the last one and a 
half decade. A genuine question that should have risen at this point is what relates 
the inflation tax to our topic namely reform non-sustenance? Well our claim is that 
the inflation tax is regressive in nature which concentrates its burden mainly on the 
poor class. The rich class having the advantage of access to financial adaptation, can 
hedge a big proportion of their income against inflation. This fact can be claimed to 
enhance distribution inequality which generates political instability that was shown 
to affect reform sustainability (Alessina and Perotti (1993)). In our analysis we 
bring this point further and claim that the actual reform period will be higher than 
that expected by the poor (wage-earners) class prior to the reform adoption. In 
what remains in this section we will review an article by Laban and Sturzenegger 
(1994) and show how their model can be modified to generate our main target in 
this section that the actual reform duration will be more than expected.
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2.2.1 The Model:
Liibari Sturzenegger (1994) assume that there are two types of agents that they call 
poor (p) and rich (r). The rich differ from the poor in that they have access to a tax 
shielding technology which allows them to reduce optimally the base upon which a 
distortionary tcix is levied. This technology is assumed not available for the poor or 
too costly. The poor and the rich receive cin endowment Cp ¿xnd respectively at 
the beginning of each period. In addition to that, before stabilization is adopted, 
the government collects an amount g per period financed through a distortionary 
tax levied on both groups, which it transfers to the poor.
The issue that both types of agents have to decide on in the beginning of each 
period is whether to stabilize or not. Stabilization which balances the government 
lj)udget is achieved through a combination of tax increases and expenditui'e cuts. 
It is assumed that there is perfect information and the only source of uncertainty 
is due to the fact that agents are not sure a priori about the effectiveness of the 
government in enforcing the stabilization program agreements.
Given this setup, the government’s budget constraint in each period t is given by;
9 =
TTi
İTp A" fi)· Ft) (2.23)1 +  7Ti
where g is the level of transfers to the poor the government collects each period, 
is the tax rate which is supposed to be determined endogenously, and depends on the 
aggregate level of tax evasion chosen by the rich at period f , F( · tt can be interpreted 
as the inflation tax, g as seignorage revenue and the tax evasion technology as 
a process of financial adaptation that take the form of capital flight, changes in 
transaction technologies, dolarization or purchases of real or indexed assets.
Engaging in financial adaptation by the rich is assumed not to be costless. Using 
an amount in financial adaptation any given time t by a rich agent, induces a 
cost c(ft, kt), where kt = ^  F, is the accumulated level of financial adaptation until
z=0
the beginning of the period t. This may be understood as a process of ’’ learning by 
doing”or the development of a wider viiriety of financial and transaction institutions. 
The following cicceptable assumptions are imposed on the cost function c{ft,kt):
Cf > 0 , cjf > 0 , > 0 , cjk > 0 , Cfjf > 0 and c(0, A' )^ =  c ;(0, Afi) =  0. Since
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individuals are assumed to be identical, in equilibrium we should have ft — F\ for 
any t.
If stabilization is not agreed upon, the poor’s share of distortionary taxation iit 
time t would be 9t such that:
0t = (2.24)Cp +  Cr — Et
where (1 — Ot) is the share born by the rich.
in addition to the distortionary tax, inflation is also assumed to have distortionary 
effects which generate welfare losses. Those losses are incorporates as a reduction 
of in the endowments of each individual where > 0 and > 0.
Built on those assumptions, the pre-stabilization utility flows for the representa­
tive agents in period t are given by:
Up(ct) =  Uiep-fixt)  +  g -  &tg) (2.25)
Ur(ct) = U{er -  f{irt) -  (1 -  et)g -  c{ft, kt)) (2.26)
where U(.) is assumed to a twice-differentiable, monotonically increasing, constant 
absolute risk aversion utility function, with risk aversion coefficient 7 > 0.
The writers assume for simplicity that post-stabilization taxes fall completely 
on the rich. The two groups bargain on the expected level of post-stabilization 
redistribution of income gU Due to the existence of instrument uncertciinty, the 
bargaining process will be built on expected values. Instrument uncertainty is 
conceptualized by assuming that ğ the amount of post stabilization transfers, equcils:
g =  tCr — a (2.27)
where a is a random variable with zero conditional mean and variance (T^ . Ihus, il 
stabilization is achieved, expected utilities in each period, conditional on the prior 
information available, would be lor the poor and rich respectively as follows:
EU{ep -t- ,(/p) -  U{ep + g^ ,) (2.28)
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EU{er +  — U[er +  g^ ) (2.29)
where g'^  cind .stand for the certainty equivalents. Thus given that ^  is the risk 
premium both agents are willing to pay in order to avoid uncertainty, we have that:
g; ^  ter 1^1 (2..30)
fr =  +
7<^ «
2 (2,31)
Laban and Sturzenegger work with a two-period time dimension cind derive 
lour main propositions implied by their model. Without entering in further proof 
technicalities, we state the propositions and discuss in turn their implications briefly:
P rop osition  1: Provided that the assumptions on U{.) and c { f ,K )  cire satisfied, 
if stabilization is not achieved in either period, we have for the stable monetary 
equilibrium that:
1. /(* > 0 for t = 1,2 (positive equilibrium level of financial adaptation);
2. /*  > fy (increasing equilibrium level of financial adaptation);
3. 7T2 > 7Ti (inflation endogenously increases);
4. $2 > ill (regressive impact of financial adaptation);
This means that the optimal degree of financial adaptation will be strictly positive 
iind increasing over time. This is due to the fact that in engaging in such process, 
the agent will equalize costs to benefits; and since the cost is decreasing (remember 
the assumptions we posited on c ( /, K),  use of financial adaptation technology would 
be increasing with cin accelerating rate of inflation.
P roposition  2: Provided that < 2(/!>(7r2) 4- c ( /2, /T2) there exists a nonempty 
set of possible agreements to achieve stabilization in period 2.
This proposition implies that in order to have an incentive to stabilize, the 
economy-wide gains from stabilization (sum of the distortions and evasion costs)
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should exceed the risk premium in engaging in an uncertain reform. Thus the 
reform will have more chances to be passed depending on;
1. The size of the distortion (2( (^7T2)).
2. The cost of financial adaptation
3. The degree of risk civersion or instrument uncertainty (7<t^).
P roposition  3: Given the results of proposition 1, ¿2p < Gp
In other words, this proposition states that the greater the level of financicil 
adaptation, the lower the expected level of transfers the poor are willing to agree 
upon in order to stabilize. That is, the bargaining position of the poor progressively 
deteriox'ates.
P roposition  4: Even if there exists a non-empty set of possible agreements to 
stabilize in period 2, it may still be an equilibrium strategy to delay stabilization in 
period 1.
Although this proposition seems counterintuitive; technically for such a case to 
rise all what we need is that the conditions in proposition 2 be satisfied in the second 
period, but not in the first.
Now, to recapitulate the míiin ideas relevant to our topic, Laban and Sturzenegger 
show that with the availability of financial adaptation to a certain group in the 
society-most likely the rich-, the poor will be forced to accept less favorable 
outcomes, in order to escape the deterioration costs of the ever-increasing inflation.
2.2.2 Extension of the Model:
Let’s now turn to our target and try to show how the actual reform duration may 
exceed that expected. For this, let’s assume that as a part of the reform financing 
program, the government intends to collect a certain share of the reform costs 
through seignorage or the inflation tax. If we assume that there is no access to 
financial adaptation by neither of the two groups then seignorage collection at eacli 
time period is:
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 28
St —
TTi
1 +
(Cp +  6r) (2.32)
Under such circumstances, and if the inflation rate is expected to be held at a 
constant level, the reform expected duration will be just that period, n®, sufficient 
to collect the necessary revenues S:
rp = S
■ sti= 7Tti+TTt (ep +  Cr))
(2.33)
Now we introduce financial adaptation to our analysis. In assuming the absence 
of such a process in the pre-reform setup we were in fact making a quite implausible 
cissurnption. However, we assume here that engaging in financial adaptation is 
not costless, and that the cost function has three cornponents-in contrast to the 
component cost function introduced by Laban and Sturzenegger-. First, the cost 
will depend on the amount that is to be evaded, /¡. The second component is 
a stock variable which refers to the knowledge and ‘know-how” accumulated
t-i
through previous evasion experiences, and hence can be expressed as F^ .
;=:0
Finall}^ the third component is a reform-specific component which captures the 
new adaptation alternatives that the reform environment induces. This may be 
‘dolarization” if the reform program contains as one of its parts the liberalization 
of foreign exchange markets. This third component is called K ‘^  and is considered
¿IS cl ‘cumulative” process that can be expressed as =  Y  , where is the time
z=to
period where the reform starts. Thus the cost of engaging in financial adaptation 
can be written as:
ct = c { f t ,K l ,D , -K f )  (2.34)
where Dt is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during the reform period.
Now, a critical step in our analysis is in the choice of the assumptions that we 
make about the behavior of the cost function. Due to the way we have characterized 
Cl, the following assumptions seem to be intuitively ’genuine’ :
The higher the amount to be evaded, the higher will be the cost: Cj > 0. 
Moreover the higher is the amount to be evaded, the higher will be the marginal
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cost of evading an extra dollar of money: C // > 0.
• Prior to the reform, the more individual engages in such a process, the more
experience and know-how he will gain, and hence the lower will be his costs: 
C'ki < 0. However, as time passes, the amount of information that can be 
gained by experiencing tends to be diminishing and hence: > 0.
• After the reform and with the emergence of new financial adaptation methods, 
the cost of evasion will be decreasing as people get acquainted with them: 
Cf,2 < 0.
From the assumption that Ckiki > 0, it follows that if the society is acquainted 
with financial adaptation a long time before the reform is proposed, then the level 
of evasion in the few years preceding the reform tends to be rather constant: Cki —
0. Thus if we assume that people ignore that the reform will affect the costs of 
evasion, which is the only source of imperfect information in our analysis; then the 
assumption that we have made in (32) about seignorage collection will not be so 
‘disastrous” . In fact, the expected reform duration would be:
5n
{ l f^ - ( e p  +  e r - F ) }
(2.35)
where E' is the pre-reform, nearly constant level of financial adaptation.
Now after the reform is adopted, the level of evasion will be increasing, but 
in order to sustain the planned level of seignorage revenues the inflation rate will 
be increasing either endogenously or through government monetary actions, with 
the burden of the inflation being more and more regressive. The planned level 
of seignorage revenues will be sustainable if we assume that the inflation rate can 
increase or be increased infinitely. However it is frequently the case that there is 
a maximum socially bearable inflation level if, beyond which it is politiccilly and 
socially non-feasible to increase the inflation level. Thus faced with the increasing- 
level of financial adaptation and a constraint on the level of inflation, the government 
may fail to collect the pre-reform planned seignorage income per-period, sC For this 
to take place cdl what we need is that at a specific period during the reform we have:
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7T
1 +  7T {Cr + Cp -  Ft) < (2.36)
Hence, if the condition in (36) occurs the expected reform duration will be less 
than the actual. And if we assume that the poor class have rational expectations 
then they will discover this fact as soon as they learn about the chcxnges in the costs 
of hnancial adaptation during the reform period.
2.2.3 Other Reasons Suggesting the same Result:
Now, apart from the technicalities above, there are in fact other factors that 
are more cippeciling intuitively, and suggest that a reform actual duration exceed 
that expected. On the one hand, while preparing for a reform program, the 
expectcitions about its duration and its feasibility are made on economic efficiency 
grounds. However once the reform starts, politics enters the game. This effects the 
progrcim itself in the sense that projects are enlarged in scale in order to benefit a 
larger electoral base. This ‘distributive tendency” arises either from pure political 
considerations or from the need of any program to gain the necessary votes for 
its adoption. Moreover, when politics enters the game we may hcive ‘productive 
inefficiency’ . The point is that politics distorts the choice of means of production 
due to cuiother component of political benefits entering the analysis. Those political 
features are discussed in great detail in Shepsle and VVeingast (1985) in the context 
of the budgeting process.
On the other hand, another aspect that may affect the duration of a reform 
program, is rehited to the institutional structure. The effectiveness of institutions 
in implementing planned reforms is often the main reason for the failure of certain 
programs.Tax collections and minimizing tax evasion is just one of the examples. 
This is not to mention the peculiarities related to the bureaucracy which is one of 
the hot research topics in the field of political economy.
Chapter 3
Empirical Demonstration
A major implication of our theoretical claims in the previous chapter is that during 
the reform period, vve would likely witness a downward movement in real wages. This 
decline will be twofold. On the one hand, due to the probable increase in income 
taxes which accompanies the reform process, there will be a decline in net after-tax 
wages. This feature is in fact present in most of the theoretical models trying to 
explore the reasons underlying the reform delay and/or non-sustainability. Most of 
these models view the pre-reform bargaining process as being between two interest 
groups over how the costs should be shared. Income taxes with their different forms 
cvre an important, if not the sole mechanism through which those shares are revealed. 
On the other hand, and as a result of the tax shifting mechanism shown theoretically 
in the previous chapter, we will likely have a decline in gross-wages. The sharpness 
of such a decline will depend on the degree of such a tax-shifting mechanism.
In order to explore the relevance of such a result, we first try to assess a 
wage determination equation. The methodology we follow to determine such an 
equation will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. Section III will be 
devoted to testing several hypothesis concerning structural changes and the effect 
of tax movements on real wages. The first section reviews the major historical 
developments that have marked the labour and government rehitionships during the 
1980s.
31
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3.1 Historical Developments During the 1980s:
3.1.1 Background:
The relcitionship between the State and labour in Turkey was not problematic until 
the 1960s. This stems from the fact that until then, a distinct industrial working 
chiss in the real sense did not emerge. On the other hand, the 1960-1980 period 
turned out to be problematic, which paved the way for the 1980 military intervention 
and the radical re-organization of the labour sector.
The confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Tiirk-Is) formed in 1952, was the 
sole labour confederation until the formation of the Confederation of Revolutionary 
Trade Unions (DISK) in 1967. Tiirk-Is was legally aided by the government in the 
sense that it was granted a representational monopoly at the national level. On the 
other hcuicl, the government played a deterministic role in tempering its demands 
and its internal governance.
The 1970s period witnessed a successful break of some unions from their ’loyal’ 
mother, the Tiirk-Is, establishing politically autonomous, riidical, and class-based 
political unions. As a result, the labour movement was fragmented into different 
groups:
1. Social Democratic unions within Türk-Is supporting left-of-centre policies of 
the Republican People’s Party.
2. The unionists within Tiirk-Is who had sympathies towards the Turkish 
Workers Party.
3. Those who formed the Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions (MISK) 
supporting the ultra-mitionalist ideology of the Nationalist Action Party.
4 . The unionists, who set up in 1976 the religiously - oriented Confederation of 
’.Justice Seekers’ Trade Unions (Ilak-Is).
As a result, this period ended in a fragmentation of the labour movement into 
competing confederations with different politiccil views. This simply kept the labour 
movement away from its main targets, serving the interests of the business sector.
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3.1.2 Government and Labour During the 1980s:
Before the military intervention which occurecl on 12 September 1980, Turkey Wcis in 
the grip of serious political crisis caused by intense fragmantation and polarization 
of the polity. The high rates of inflation revealed the inability of the governments 
to resist the demands made over them. Stabilization policies were strongly resisted, 
especially by the labour class, upon whom heavy costs would have been imposed.
The first measures of the military upon assuming power was to close down all 
three union confedercitions (DISK, Hak-Is, and MISK) outside Tiirk-Is, and to ban 
cdl strikes until further notice. In addition, a system of inspection was set up. This 
led to a close, day-to-day supervision of the activities of the unions and, in the 
process, to an outright campaign against Tiirk-Is. The most serious restrictions 
in the new Labour Code, however, were those on the right to strike, so that the 
fashionable debate until 1987 was whether or not the right to strike was a viable 
option.
Another source of distress for organised labour in the post-1980 period has been 
the de-unionization policy of the government in the public sector, which was put 
into effect by a circular letter of the Prime Minister’s office in 1985. The policy 
was bcised on the recruitment of public sector employees on the basis of conti'cicts. 
This mechanism, by offering higher wages cind better working conditions to the new 
employees, aimed at reducing the attraction of unionization and, in the final analysis, 
at eliminating the effectiveness of unions. This lasted until the Constitutional Court 
annulée! this decree in December 1988.
The strategy that had been pursued by the Tiirk-Is against the government 
underwent an importcint transformation in 1987, due to the spontaneous resurgence 
of the labour movement as a response to the drastic decline in the purchasing power 
of the workers brought about by high inflation . In a strategic move to increiise 
its leverage over the government, Tiirk-Is withdrew its support from the ruling 
Motherland-Party (ANAP) on three different occasions:
1. The by-elections of 1986.
2. The referendum on 14 September 19987, for the reinstatement of the political 
rights of the pre-1980 political leaders.
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3. The 29 November 1987 general elections.
3.2 Methodology:
In our search for a wage determination equation we follow the standard cipproach, 
conveniently summarized in Oswald (1982). We envisage real wages adjusting to a 
real wage target or norm, which is established through union-industry bargaining. 
Profit maximizing firms set employment so that the real wage is equated to the 
marginal product of labor. Unions set the real wage to maximize utility subject 
to the constraint imposed by the firms’labour demand curve. We mcike the 
conventional assumption that the union utility depends positively on the real wage 
and employment. The union’s optimization problem, then, is given by:
Subject to:
where: ^  =  The real wage,
L - Employment,
7/ =  a shift parameter. 
This yields the solution:
r r f ^ ^  rmax U — , L(W!P),L V P
L = L i J , ,
(3.1)
(3.2)
where: Uw =  77^'XL· ‘,7 ’
TT -  ^
~  8L'>
Lw = 6L
— Uw
----- — = L w
Ul ^
(3.3)
The equilibrium real wage ( f · ) '  and employment level ( f )  are given by the point
ence curveof tangency between the labor demand curve {L^) cind a union indiffer 
{[)  in fig.l. The equilibrium real wage depends on the shift parameter 7/ ,  which
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Figure 3.1: Real Wage Determination.
vve assume depends on productivity and the terms of trade. It is usual for labor 
demand to depend on productivity, or some variable to represent technology, but 
for an open economy like Turkey after the year 1980 it is also necessary to include 
the terms of trade, which affects the real value of output to firms. The equilibrium 
real Wcige now depends on productivity and the terms of trade (TT):
W
-p)r^^
Where: Y =GNP,
L — Total labor force. 
Or in logarithmic form:
ai
{TT)T (3.4)
In ( —  ) =  «0 +  «1 In ( — ) + a 2ln(TT)
PJt
Y
(3.5)
However, our discussion so-far of the real wage determination is consistent with 
full-employment. In this sense we assume that the actual real wage adjusts to the 
difference between the target real wage and the actual real Wcige in the
previous period, and is affected by the last period’s level of unemployment {Ut-i), 
the current period’s terms of trade and the level of inflation (AlnP^). .Chat
is:
I n f i i i  - I n f i ï
P i - l P t- 1
+ /?2 In Ut-1 +  /?3 ln(TT)i +  A In R  (3.6)
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where: P =Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Together with the equilibrium real wage equation (3.5), this yields our basic 
equation to be implemented empirically:
i-l
nil —  I =5o +  <5iln( — 1 +(52İ n ( - )  + ¿3  ln (T T )(_ i+¿4 In f /(_ i+¿5 ln (TT)i+  (5sA In P,
(.3.7)
3.3 Empirical Implementation:
Being armed with the basic real-wage determination equation in (3.7), our 
empirical implementation proceeds as follows. First, using the time series data 
for real public wages and real public salaries, we identify the relevant variables that 
enter the wage determination. Second, we test for the effect of the abolishment of 
public agreements (Toplu Sözleşme) between the years 1982-1989 which is visually 
clear in the data plot in fig.2. Finally, and using procedures that will be explained 
below, we test for the presence of the tax-shifting process.
3.3.1 Real Public Wages:
Identification:
In our search for the appropriate variables that affect the real public wage 
determination, all the variables identified theoretically in equation (3.7) were 
included. However, the only variables that came out to be significant were inflation 
(AlriTi),  and Ut-i· Using OLS, the results obtained were: (for further
details see table.1 in Appendix.A):
^Throughout our empirical iiriplementation, the restricted availability of useful tiatii was 
deterministic in shaping our final results.
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Figure 3.2: Data Plots
OLS 1964- 93
In =  0.632 -  0.06.5In U t-i -  0.067A lnP( +  0.95In
(0.59) (-0.31) (-0.24) (9.51)
R “ — adj =  0.9 0
(3.8)
The Abolishment of the Public Agreements Effect:
in order to test for the effect of the abolishment of the public agreements during 
the period 1981-1987, a dummy variable (Di) that takes the value of 1 during the 
identified period was included. Using OLS, the results obtained were: (for further 
details see table.2 in Appendi.x.A):
OLS 1964 -  93
l n ( f ) ^  =  1.365-  0..526 InP,_i -0 .4 4 A ln P ,- f  0.98 In -0 .251  A  (3 ,9)
(1.54) (-2.54) (-1.79) (12) (-3.78)
-  adj =  0.93
Where the number in brackets indicate the t-value.
Thus we see that there was a significant decline in public real wages during 
the period 1981-1987. Including such an effect has led to an amelioration in the 
coefficient of determination adjusted for the degrees of freedom.
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Testing for the presence of tax-shifting:
In our process of testing for the presence of tax-shifting, the first hypothesis we test 
is whether there has been a decline in real wages during the reform period that we 
assume to have started in the year 1980. If we assume that during the reform period 
there has been an increase in capital tcixes and since we are using the gross real 
wage series, such a decline will be considered as a partial evidence for the presence 
of such a tax-shifting process. We define a dummy variable {D2) that takes a value 
of 1 starting from the year 1980 and we add to the equation in (3.9). Using OLS, 
the results obtained were: (for further details see table.3 in Appendix.A):
OLS L964 -  9.3
ln (^ )^  =  1.011-O ..5 InC/(_i -0 .8 2 A ln P , -F 1.022In -  0.35i?i -l· 0.176L>2
(1.15) (-2 .5 .3 ) (-2.50) (12.40) (-3.96) (1.67)
/2“ — adj =  0.93
(3.10)
Thus, in contradiction with our expectations, we find no evdence for a decline in 
gross real wages during the indicated reform period. The results indicate that there 
has been rather an increase in goss real wages during that period. However, such 
an increase is insignificant at the conventional %95 significance level. Moreover, 
taking into account the significant effect of the abolishment of public agreements 
which Icisted for most of the period, the overall effect indicates a decline in gross 
real wages.
Now we carry our analysis further and we tackle the matter in a more direct 
way. We follow the progress of the tax rate on government enterprises and we add 
it in logarithmic form to the equation in (3.9) (a full outline of Turkey’s major 
tax reforms is displayed in appendix.B). The tax on government enterprises is first 
introduced in the year 1980 at the rate of %35, raised to %40 in 1984 and raised 
further to %49 in the year 1985. Using OLS, the results obtained were: (for further 
details see tcible.4 in Appendix.A):
OLS 1964 -  93
ln ( ^ ) ^  = 1.27 -  0.5661ni/,-i -  0.763AliiPi 4-1.0061n(f-)^_j -0.3.5Di -0 .1 7 In/
(1.44) (-2.73) (-2.12) (12.08) ' - ................ ...
/2“ -  adj =  0.93
(-3.33) (-1.21)
(3.11)
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As expected, the results indicate that there is some evidence for taxes on 
government entreprises to affect negatively gross real public wages. However, this 
decline is not significant at the conventional %95 significance level.
3.3.2 Real Public Salaries:
Identification:
In our search for real public salaries determination equation, the same procedure 
followed previously was adopted. All the variables identified in equation (3.7) were 
given their best chance, and the only variables that came out to be significant 
are: InUt, and In Using OLS, the results obtained were: (for further
details see table..5 in Appendix.A):
OLS 1964 -  90
In =  2.05 +  0.136 InUt +  0.755 In +  0.007 In (^)^_^
(1.37) (0.89) (4.78) (0.38)
R - -  adj=0.65
(3.12)
The Abolishment of the Public Agreements Effect:
In order to test for the effect of the abolishment of the public agreements, the same 
variable (Di) defined previously was added to equation (3.12). {Di)is assumed to 
take the value of 1 between the years 1982-1987. Using OLS, the results obtained 
were: (for further details see table.6 in Appendix.A):
OLS 1964 -  90
In { f ) .  =  5.77 -  0.2 \nUt +  0.432 In ( f  )^_  ^ +  0.03 In ( ^ ) , _ j  -  0 .292^
(3.23) (-1.17) (2.49) (1.60) (-3.0)
R ’’ -  adj=0.V i
(3.13)
The results indicate a highly significant decline in gross public real salaries. 
Including such an effect has led to a substantial increase in the coefficient of 
determination adjusted for the degrees of freedom, as well as getting a true sign 
lor the coefficient of ln(7i.
CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATION 40
Testing for the Presence of Tax-shifting:
In this context, what we mean by tax-shifting is the decline in gross real salaries 
during a reform period. The same variable {D2) defined previously is added to 
eqimtion (3.13). Using OLS, the results obtained were; (for further details see 
table.7 in Appendix.A):
OLS 1964 -  90
‘n =  6 .7 7 - 0.374In C/( -f 0.363 In +  0.031 In (| )^^_  ^ -  0.26L>i -  O .U 8D 2 f3 14)
(3..51) (-1.72) (2.0.3) (1.71) (-2.63) (-1.27) ^
— adj=0.7o
Hopefully, the results indicate that during the identified reform period (1980..), 
there has been a decline in gross real public salaries. This decline is not significant 
at the conventional %95 significance level.
3.4 Conclusion:
To conclude with, we have shown that there is partial (although not statistically 
significant) evidence indicating that a tax imposed on government enterprises leads 
to a decline in gross real public wages. Moreover, we have shown that there is a 
partial evidence suggesting the gross real public salaries to have declined during the 
pointed reform period. In fact, there are other reasons suggesting that a corporate 
tcix would have a negative effect on workers’ real wages one of which is suggested 
by standard economic principles. A rise in the corporate tax generates an increase 
in the production costs to capital owners. This cost increase leads to decreasing the 
optimal levels of production with a resulting labor force layoffs. This leads to cin 
increase in the unemployment level which in turn pulls the wage levels downwards.
Another result implied by our work is that the last period’s real wage and salary 
level I^n enters the determination of the current period’s wage or salary
level. However, in the public wages, such a relation is more staightforward in the 
sense that the hypothesis of a one-to-one influence in ¿ill the equations (3.8) to (3.11).
Those results, if we assume being unexpected by the workers’ class prior to an
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economic reform, lead us to make our claim that the workers underestimate the 
costs that they will incur during the reform period.
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Appendix B
1949-1950:
1. Global personal income tax (PIT) replaces schedular income taxes; agriculture 
cincl small business is exempt along with interest on government bonds and 
small deposits; rate brackets range between 15-45%;
2. Corporation income tax (CIT) introduced at a 10% rate plus 15% of after-tcix 
profits (creditable against PIT if redistribution occurs); government-owned 
monopolies exempt;
3. Snuill businesses tax levied on rent paid on personal income;
4. Agriculture made subject to a livestock tax;
5. Modest tax on urban real estate and inheritances introduced.
1956:
1. Mcinufacturer’s sales tax replaced by excise taxes on manufacturing inputs;
2. Small business tax abolished;
3. Upper rate of the (personal income tax) PIT raised from 35 to 50%.
I960-1963:
49
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1. Income tax extended to agriculture with small farmers exempt and medium- 
size farmers taxed according to presumed expense;
2. PIT rate brackets adjusted to a 10-60% range;
3. CIT rate raised to 20%; 20% withholding on after-tax profits;
4. Livestock tcix abolished; land tax reintroduced;
5. Stamp duty on imports;
6. A 30% investment deduction allowed in addition to normal depreciation.
1966:
A cornucopia of investment incentives was introduced exempting invest­
ment goods from import duties, stamp duties, real estate purchase lees, 
bank cirid insurance transaction tax.
1970-1972:
1. Seven new taxes introduced: 5-30% retail sales tax on services and luxury 
goods, capital gains tax on recil property, motor vehicle purchase tax, sport 
lottery tax, building and construction acquisition tax, sell-assessed land and 
building tax (replaced the old land and building tax collected by provinces); 
fiscal balance tax (a surtax on incomes) to replace the compulsory savings 
program;
2. Multiple job holdings taxed as if there were a single source of income;
3. Banking and insurance transactions tax (BITT) raised trom 20 to 2o%;
4. CIT rate raised to 25% plus an additional 20% on after-tax profits whether 
distributed or not;
5. Constitutional amendment made it possible to delegate powers to government 
for changing rates between upper and lower limits stated in the tax laws.
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1980:
1. New rate brackets and altered rate structure (40-60% range) for PIT;
2. Pligher ceilings and rates for lump sum taxes paid by small businesses and the 
liberal professions;
3. Advance payments for income tax filers;
4. Narrower definition of tax exempt farmers;
5. Mciximurn deduction of 70% for presumed agricultural expenses of medium 
sized farmers;
6. Absentee land owners taxed under the provisions for rental income;
7. 5% withholding tax on all agricultural sales;
8. Withholding on dividends and interest income raised to 25% (from 20%) cind 
small deposit interest exemption eliminated;
9. Rental income from business real estate made subject to 25% withholding;
10. Corporate rate raised from 43 to 50% and government enterprises taxed at 
35%;
11. Loss carry-forward reduced from 5 to 3 years;
12. Capital gains from corporate reorganization made non-taxable;
13. Higher motor vehicle and construction taxes;
14. New sales tax cit a uniform 3% rate.
1981:
1. Cities and provinces to receive 5 and 1%, respectively of all central government 
revenue;
2. BLCT reduced from 25 to L5% but all the banks’ gross income made ta.xable;
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3. Ccipital gains tax on real estate adjusted by raising brackets fivefold and 
modifying the range of rates to 10-50%.
198.0).
1. PIT rates gradually altered to a 25-50% range;
2. (TT rate reduced to 40% and 20% of export-related revenues made deductible;
3. Introduction of living standards assessment system ¿is a minimum tax on 
income tax filers;
4. Withholding on interest income reduced to 20% (30% on bearer certificates of 
deposit);
5. Real estate purchase tax and capital gains tax on real property replaced by a 
4% real estate duty on both buyer and seller;
6. Extra-budgetary fund (EBF) for housing established; rapid expansion of other 
EBFs in subsequent years.
1983:
BITT reduced from 15 to 3%.
1984:
1. Tax collection through commercial banks;
2. Withholding on interest income reduced to 10%;
3. Stcite-owned enterprises made fully taxcible;
4. 6% consumption tax on petroleum products introduced;
5. more extra-budgetary funds created.
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1985:
1. Value-added tax (VAT) introduced at a uniform 10% rate to replace 7 other 
taxes: the production taxes on domestic production and imports, the business 
tax, the transportation tax, the sugar consumption tax, the PTT services tax, 
the sports-lottery tax and the advertising services tax;
2. Lumpsum tax limits raised by a factor of 4;
3. Fines and pentilties increased 10 times;
4. Reduced withholding rate on interest income to 10% (3% on government 
bonds);
5. No withholding on dividends at the personal level;
6. Agricultural withholding revised to 3% on animal sales and 7% on all others;
7. Advance tax payments for income taxpayers established at 50% of VAT 
obligations;
8. Corporate tax rate raised to 46% plus a 3% surtax for the Fund to support 
Defence Industry;
9. More resources invested in tax administration.
1986:
1. Basic VAT rate raised to 12% and multiple rates introduced;
2. BITT reduced to 1%; 13.5% special VAT regime for sma,ll retailers ccincelled.
1987:
1. Deprecicition balances indexed to the rate ol inficition;
2. Machinery purchases to enjoy 50% declining balance depreciirtion;
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3. Expensing allowed for some sectoral investments.
1.988:
1. Increased rate differentiation in the VAT (7 rates including a 0 rate) and basic 
rate to 10%;
2. Agricultural withholding reduced to 2% on animal sales and 4% on all other 
sciles;
3. Special VAT regime for small retailers reintroduced;
4. System of advance PIT payments based on VAT revised and geared to a 
fraction of the previous year’s PIT;
5. Tax holidays given for investments in educational, health and sports facilities;
6. Tax rebates on exports was phased out during the year and subsidies from 
encouragement and stabilization fund were paid to exports on a specific basis. 
These subsidies were later removed in 1989;
7. A minimum tax, irrespective of profits or losses, was introduced on corpora­
tions.
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Chapter 4
A  Simple Recapitulative Model
In the light of the results that we have achieved so far regarding the underestimation 
by the ’’ poor” class of the costs and duration of an economic reform, we try to bring 
the pieces together in a trial to achieve a simple model that may come up to be 
useful in its implications about the reform sustenance.
It is sometimes claimed that simplicity is a factor that strengthens theories. 
However, by the word ’’ simple” we never mean that the achieved model is complete 
cind superior theoretically to the other models suggested by the literature. Rather, 
the word ’’ simple” is used in its normal and straightforward meaning, in the sense 
that the model may be subjected to many extensions and may be still considered 
as a ’’ raw material” , or even may be claimed to be irrelevant. In this context, all 
suggestions and criticisms are welcomed.
4.1 The Model:
VVe consider a country (X), that is intending to undergo a structural economic retbrm 
such as a trade liberalization, the removal of price controls and privatization. VVe 
assume that (X) has no history with the reform in the sense that the same economic 
reform, or cinother having the same aim has never been started previously. 1 lie 
meanings of this assumption will be discussed below. We lurther assume that the 
society in (X) is characterized by being divided in to two social chisses; (R) standing
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for the rich capital owners and (P) standing for the poor wage-earners. The poor- 
class is assumed to be composed of identical individuals that form the majority, and 
hence are the decisive factor in the decision process over any policy issue.
VVe assume that a representative individual (x) belonging to (P) originally has an 
income ( T') that is expected to stay at the same level if the reform is not adopted. 
'I'hc reform in question is planned to be started at time (¿0) if voted for, with an 
expected duration (D' )^ and an expected income The post-reform expected
income level is (P)  where < 1° < P\ Note that the e.xpectations about the 
reform duration are based upon the information stock available prior to the reform.
Now, once the economic reform has gained the necessary support and is adopted, 
the situation will change. Due to the process of tcix-shifting, as well as the 
concentration of the tax burden on the poor chiss, which we assume unexpected 
prior to the reform adoption, the actual cost incurred by (P) will be higher than tlmt 
expected, cind as a result the actual income they will get during the reform is ( / ' “) 
where trivially: < P^. Moreover, and based on our earlier assumption of the fact
that (X) has no reform history, the new financial adaptation instruments that emerge 
with the reform are une.xpected by (P). As shown in detail in the .second section 
of our theoretical chapter, these new adaptation instruments generate a decline in 
the expected inflation-tax revenues, which leads the actual reform duration (/9") 
to be longer than that expected: . Finally, we assume without loss of
generality that the post-reform expected income level is unchanged when the reform 
is adopted.
y\ll the components of our model are summarized diagrarnmatically in fig.l. VVe 
assume for simplicity that if the reform is disrupted before its ’’maturity” , the 
individual gets an income [P)  for the rest of the ’’game” .
P rop osition  0: If for any x€P, the rate of time preference p < I, then it is 
possible in the previously described setting to have ’’ short-lived” reforms, in the 
sense that a reform is adopted based on ex-ante expectations, but fails to gain the 
necessary support once adopted.
Proof: We first note that for the reform to have passed at fo, it should have 
gained the support of (P) since we assume that (P) is a class of identical individuals 
that form the majority in (X). Now, for any individual member of (P) to vote lor
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Figure 4.1: Model Scheme.
the reform cit time to, his expected present value of the future payoffs if the reform 
is adopted should exceed that of getting (/° )  each period once the reform is not 
adopted. That is, for any xGP, the following condition should be satisfied:
TO D'- rp
7^  < E·*■ P ¿=0 1 -  p ;4.i)
Now, suppose that after the reform was started, it fails to be sustained. Then 
it should be the case that (P) is no more in favor of it. If, for instance, such a 
phenomenon rises after n periods have passed, then we should have:
1 - p
¡P
l - p
(4.2)
The conditions in (4.1) and (4.2) may be shown to be satisfied if we have the 
following conditions that we have already assumed:
1. < r \
2. D" <  D P
p < 1.
4.2 Implications of the Model:
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Throughout this section, we will state several propositions implied by our model. 
We avoid entering in the proof technicalities, however we show how this propositions 
relate to the results derived by the literature.
P rop osition  1: The lower is 7°, the higher the probability that the reform will 
pass and be sustained.
The link between this proposition and the literature is quite strciightforward. 
It states that the initicd situation is a deterministic factor for the reform to péiss 
and be sustciined. In the same context, Rodrik (1993) argued that macroeconomic 
imbalances determine the urgency of a reform. He adds that in circumstances of 
extreme macroeconomic imbalances, a reform can benefit from the unsustainability 
of the status quo to gcdn the necessary support for its adoption. Moreover, Laban 
and Sturzenegger (1994) elaborate on the same point and show theoretically that 
even if there is no uncertainty about the evolution path of the economy of getting 
worse, it may be optimal to postpone the reform. The extra point introduced by 
our model is that ’’ poor” status quo income level is an advantage for the reform to 
be sustained.
P rop osition  2: The same reform program if adopted for a second time after 
failure, hcis more chances to be politically sustained until maturity.
If we take in consideration the fact that the sources leading (P) to have wrong 
expectations once the reform is adopted for the first time, will be incorporated in 
the individual’s expectations, the result in the proposition follows. The new sources 
of financial adaptation that emerge with the reform, as well as the process of tax- 
shifting will be expected by (P) if asked to vote for the same reform in a second 
time. This leads them to accept the reform only if the status quo income level is 
low enough to make it a feasible strategy. This provides a partial explanation for 
the fact that many reforms in previously centrally planned economies have failed to 
be sustained originally, but proved successful once adopted in later circumstances.
P rop osition  3: The longer is D‘\ the higher is the probability for a reform to 
be ’’ short-lived” .
The actual length of a reform program depends -other things being et|ual- on the 
program extent. Structural reform programs will normally require longer transition
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periods. VVhcit this proposition suggest is that a gradual approach to reform ma be 
more successful from a sustainability point of view. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Wei (1993) in the context of a trade liberalization, where he shoes 
that adopting the reform gradually may help- overpassing the difficulties of non- 
sustenance of economically efficient reforms. However, he rationalizes this result by 
the fact that a gradual approcich may alter the nature of the political system by 
building a constituency in hivor of the continuation of reforms.
P roposition  4: The higher is the lower is the probability that the reform 
will be non-sustained.
I  he actiuil income level that an individual member of (P) will get during the 
reform will be higher if we introduce a redistributional schemes such as safety nets. 
Moreover, the role of foreign assistance is deterministic in this respect. This result is 
consistent with the argument of Sachs (1989) that foreign assistance can strengthen 
the position of reformers and therefore enhance the politiccil sustainability of reforms.
P rop osition  5: The lower is the discount rate />, the lower the probability of 
the reform being adopted and sustained.
The discount rate p will depend on mciriy psychologiciil factors cirnong which we 
Ccin probably include political risk and credibility. The higher is the degree of the 
political risk, the less the weight that will be assigned to future payoffs, and the more 
weight that will be cissigned to present income streams. In this sense, our result is 
consistent with the claims of Rodrik (1989) who suggests that the sustcvinability 
of reform may benefit from an initicil ’’ overshooting” , becciuse this would enhance 
credibility by signaling to the public the seriousness of the government’s intentions.
4.3 Conclusion and Possible Extensions:
To conclude with, our theoretical claims in the second chapter regarding tax-shifting 
and the concentration of the inflation-tax burden on the poor wage-earners class, can 
cause the non-sustainability of economic reforms after being adopted. Those two 
elenK.uits with their implications regarding the reform duration and cost-sharing, 
where incorporated in a simple model. Inspite of its simplicity, the model proved
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able to give rise to different results regarding the optimal speed of a reform, the role 
of foreign assistance, political uncertainty and government credibility.
The main deficiency of this model is that it ignores the role of the government 
and considers it as a passive agent. A simple extension can be easily made to study 
the impact of government cictions and its policy stance during election periods, on 
the sustainability of an economic reform.
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